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0000002555 00000 n 695 20 xref [32] Notably, discussions among U.S. policymakers to block Chinese investment in U.S. AI companies also began at this time.[33]. 0000004572 00000 n It involves a group of . Civilians and civilian objects are protected under the laws of armed conflict by the principle of distinction. The stag hunt differs from the prisoner's dilemma in that there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria:[2] one where both players cooperate, and one where both players defect. In short, the theory suggests the variables that affect the payoff structure of cooperating or defecting from an AI Coordination Regime that determine which model of coordination we see arise between the two actors (modeled after normal-form game setups). This is visually represented in Table 3 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. hRj0pq%[a00a IIR~>jzNTDLC=Qm=,e-[Vi?kCE"X~5eyE]/2z))!6fqfx6sHD8&: s>)Mg 5>6v9\s7U [52] Stefan Persson, Deadlocks in International Negotiation, Cooperation and Conflict 29, 3(1994): 211244. Stag hunt definition: a hunt carried out to find and kill stags | Meaning, pronunciation, translations and examples PxF`4f$CN*}S -'2Y72Dl0%^JOG?Y,XT@ dF6l]+$.~Qrjj}46.#Z x^iyY2)/c lLU[q#r)^X In these abstractions, we assume two utility-maximizing actors with perfect information about each others preferences and behaviors. In short, the theory suggests that the variables that affect the payoff structure of cooperating or defecting from an AI Coordination Regime determine which model of coordination we see arise between the two actors (modeled after normal-form game setups). It is his argument: "The information that such an agreement conveys is not that the players will keep it (since it is not binding), but that each wants the other to keep it." David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. GAME THEORY FOR INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS - University of South Carolina Payoff matrix for simulated Stag Hunt. HV6am`vjyJ%K>{:kK$C$$EedI3OilJZT$h_'eN. Last Resort, Legitimate authority, Just cause, high probablity of succession, right intention, proportionality, casualities. Similar strategic analyses can be done on variables and variable relationships outlined in this model. As described in the previous section, this arms race dynamic is particularly worrisome due to the existential risks that arise from AIs development and call for appropriate measures to mitigate it. Table 13. As discussed, there are both great benefits and harms to developing AI, and due to the relevance AI development has to national security, it is likely that governments will take over this development (specifically the US and China). One nation can then cheat on the agreement, and receives more of a benefit at the cost of the other. An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. In times of stress, individual unicellular protists will aggregate to form one large body. The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 14. endstream endobj 1 0 obj <> endobj 2 0 obj [/PDF/Text] endobj 3 0 obj <> endobj 8 0 obj <> endobj 9 0 obj <>stream [56] Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation., [57] This is additionally explored in Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.. On the other hand, Glaser[46] argues that rational actors under certain conditions might opt for cooperative policies. This can be facilitated, for example, by a state leader publicly and dramatically expressing understanding of danger and willingness to negotiate with other states to achieve this. In game theory, the stag hunt is a game that describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. Despite the damage it could cause, the impulse to go it alone has never been far off, given the profound uncertainties that define the politics of any war-torn country. The story is briey told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality: "If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach PDF A game theory view of the relationship between the U.S., China and Taiwan trailer International Relations Classical Realism- Morganthau- anarchy is assumed as a prominent concern in international relations,with the international Stag Hunt September 21, 2015 | category: If they are discovered, or do not cooperate, the stag will flee, and all will go hungry. [6] Moreover, speculative accounts of competition and arms races have begun to increase in prominence[7], while state actors have begun to take steps that seem to support this assessment. We have recently seen an increase in media acknowledgement of the benefits of artificial intelligence (AI), as well as the negative social implications that can arise from its development. [54] In a bilateral AI development scenario, the distribution variable can be described as an actors likelihood of winning * percent of benefits gained by winner (this would be reflected in the terms of the Coordination Regime). So it seems that, while we still are motivated by own self-interest, the addition of social dynamics to the two-person Stag Hunt game leads to a tendency of most people agreeing to hunt the stag. The closestapproximationof this in International Relations are universal treaties, like the KyotoProtocolenvironmental treaty. Payoff variables for simulated Prisoners Dilemma. In this scenario, however, both actors can also anticipate to the receive additional anticipated harm from the defector pursuing their own AI development outside of the regime. For example, international sanctions involve cooperation against target countries (Martin, 1992a; Drezner, . This additional benefit is expressed here as P_(b|A) (A)b_A. Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate Created Date: 20160809151831Z What is coercive bargaining and the Stag Hunt? Give an example Two players, simultaneous decisions. Formally, a stag hunt is a game with two pure strategy Nash equilibriaone that is risk dominant and another that is payoff dominant. [5] They can, for example, work together to improve good corporate governance. [32] Paul Mozur, Beijing Wants A.I. For the cooperator (here, Actor B), the benefit they can expect to receive from cooperating would be the same as if both actors cooperated [P_(b|B) (AB)b_Bd_B]. This table contains a representation of a payoff matrix. Game Theory Metaphors | SpringerLink It would be much better for each hunter, acting individually, to give up total autonomy and minimal risk, which brings only the small reward of the hare. Although most authors focus on the prisoner's dilemma as the game that best represents the problem of social cooperation, some authors believe that the stag hunt represents an equally (or more) interesting context in which to study cooperation and its problems (for an overview see Skyrms 2004). 2020 Yale International Relations Association | New Haven, CT, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610026/algorithms-are-making-american-inequality-worse/, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/china-artificial-intelligence.html, Interview with YPG volunteer soldier Brace Belden, Shaping Saddam: How the Media Mythologized A Monster Honorable Mention, Probability Actor A believes it will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes Actor A will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes Actor B will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes it will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a beneficial AI, Percent of benefits Actor A can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime, Percent of benefits Actor B can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime, Actor As perceived utility from developing beneficial AI, Actor Bs perceived utility from developing beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes it will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes Actor A will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor A believes Actor B will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes it will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor A believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a harmful AI, Actor As perceived harm from developing a harmful AI, Actor Bs perceived harm from developing a harmful AI. Finally, Jervis[40] also highlights the security dilemma where increases in an actors security can inherently lead to the decreased security of a rival state. Jean-Jacques Rousseau described a situation in which two individuals go out on a hunt. [11] In our everyday lives, we store AI technology as voice assistants in our pockets[12] and as vehicle controllers in our garages. Stag hunt - Wikipedia 0000002790 00000 n For instance if a=10, b=5, c=0, and d=2. Both games are games of cooperation, but in the Stag-hunt there is hope you can get to the "good" outcome. Press: 1992). Therefore, an agreement to play (c,c) conveys no information about what the players will do, and cannot be considered self-enforcing." Social Stability and Catastrophe Risk: Lessons From the Stag Hunt a Combining both countries economic and technical ecosystem with government pressures to develop AI, it is reasonable to conceive of an AI race primarily dominated by these two international actors. Still, predicting these values and forecasting probabilities based on information we do have is valuable and should not be ignored solely because it is not perfect information. <>stream In addition to the example suggested by Rousseau, David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. %PDF-1.7 % Despite this, there still might be cases where the expected benefits of pursuing AI development alone outweigh (in the perception of the actor) the potential harms that might arise. [31] Meanwhile, U.S. military and intelligence agencies like the NSA and DARPA continue to fund public AI research. Together, these elements in the arms control literature suggest that there may be potential for states as untrusting, rational actors existing in a state of international anarchy to coordinate on AI development in order to reduce future potential global harms. This variant of the game may end with the trust rewarded, and it may result with the trusting party alone receiving full penalty, thus, leading to a new game of revenge. The matrix above provides one example. startxref As a result, this tradeoff between costs and benefits has the potential to hinder prospects for cooperation under an AI Coordination Regime. In this section, I briefly argue that state governments are likely to eventually control the development of AI (either through direct development or intense monitoring and regulation of state-friendly companies)[29], and that the current landscape suggests two states in particular China and the United States are most likely to reach development of an advanced AI system first. As the infighting continues, the impulse to forego the elusive stag in favor of the rabbits on offer will grow stronger by the day. Orcas cooperatively corral large schools of fish to the surface and stun them by hitting them with their tails. 7into the two-person Stag Hunt: This is an exact version of the8 informal arguments of Hume and Hobbes. [16] Google DeepMind, DeepMind and Blizzard open StarCraft II as an AI research environment, https://deepmind.com/blog/deepmind-and-blizzard-open-starcraft-ii-ai-research-environment/. One example payoff structure that results in a Deadlock is outlined in Table 9. If all the hunters work together, they can kill the stag and all eat. Additionally, both actors can expect a greater return if they both cooperate rather than both defect. Economic Theory of Networks at Temple University, Economic theory of networks course discussion. As we discussed in class, the catch is that the players involved must all work together in order to successfully hunt the stag and reap the rewards once one person leaves the hunt for a hare, the stag hunt fails and those involved in it wind up with nothing. On the other hand, real life examples of poorly designed compensation structures that create organizational inefficiencies and hinder success are not uncommon. This is taken to be an important analogy for social cooperation. Stag Hunt: Anti-Corruption Disclosures Concerning Natural Resources One example addresses two individuals who must row a boat. [55] See also Bostrom, Superintelligence at Chapter 14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified . There are three levels - the man, the structure of the state and the international system. What is the so-called 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping? Depending on which model is present, we can get a better sense of the likelihood of cooperation or defection, which can in turn inform research and policy agendas to address this. Advanced AI technologies have the potential to provide transformative social and economic benefits like preventing deaths in auto collisions,[17] drastically improving healthcare,[18] reducing poverty through economic bounty,[19] and potentially even finding solutions to some of our most menacing problems like climate change.[20]. Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in N-Person Stag Hunt Dilemmas In the same vein, Sorenson[39] argues that unexpected technological breakthroughs in weaponry raise instability in arms races. If, by contrast, the prospect of a return to anarchy looms, trust erodes and short-sighted self-interest wins the day. As is customary in game theory, the first number in each cell represents how desirable the outcome is for Row (in this case, Actor A), and the second number represents how desirable the same outcome is for Column (Actor B). Of Stag Hunts and secret societies: Cooperation, male coalitions and Game Theory 101: The Complete William Spaniel shows how to solve the Stag Hunt using pure strategy Nash equilibrium. So far, the readings discussed have commented on the unique qualities of technological or qualitative arms races. In each of these models, the payoffs can be most simply described as the anticipated benefit from developing AI minus the anticipated harm from developing AI. Payoff variables for simulated Deadlock, Table 10. By failing to agree to a Coordination Regime at all [D,D], we can expect the chance of developing a harmful AI to be highest as both actors are sparing in applying safety precautions to development. [16], On one hand, these developments outline a bright future. Table 2. hVN0ii ipv@B\Z7 'Q{6A"@](v`Q(TJ}Px^AYbA`Z&gh'{HoF4 JQb&b`#B$03an8"3V0yFZbwonu#xZ? Explain how the 'Responsibility to Protect' norm tries to provide a compromise between the UN Charter's principle of non-interference (state sovereignty) and the UN genocide convention. LTgC9Nif For example, can the structure of distribution impact an actors perception of the game as cooperation or defection dominated (if so, should we focus strategic resources on developing accountability strategies that can effectively enforce distribution)? These differences create four distinct models of scenarios we can expect to occur: Prisoners Dilemma, Deadlock, Chicken, and Stag Hunt. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world., China, Russia, soon all countries w strong computer science. ? 1. Additionally, Koubi[42] develops a model of military technological races that suggests the level of spending on research and development varies with changes in an actors relative position in a race. Absolute gains will engage in comparative advantage and expand the overall economy while relative . The Stag Hunt 2,589 views Aug 6, 2020 A brief introduction to the stag hunt game in international relations. For example, suppose we have a prisoner's dilemma as pictured in Figure 3. Despite the large number of variables addressed in this paper, this is at its core a simple theory with the aims of motivating additional analysis and research to branch off. 0000000016 00000 n (Pergamon Press: 1985). The Stag Hunt Game: An Example of an Excel-Based Probabilistic Game Table 4. One hunter can catch a hare alone with less effort and less time, but it is worth far less than a stag and has much less meat. The most important role of the U.S. presence is to keep the Afghan state afloat, and while the negotiations may turn out to be a positive development, U.S. troops must remain in the near term to ensure the possibility of a credible deal. No payoffs (that satisfy the above conditions including risk dominance) can generate a mixed strategy equilibrium where Stag is played with a probability higher than one half. The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 10. Gardner's vision, the removal of inferior, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole. For example, if the two international actors cooperate with one another, we can expect some reduction in individual payoffs if both sides agree to distribute benefits amongst each other. Huntington[37] makes a distinction between qualitative arms races (where technological developments radically transform the nature of a countrys military capabilities) and quantitative arms races (where competition is driven by the sheer size of an actors arsenal). Here, we have the formation of a modest social contract. In their paper, the authors suggest Both the game that underlies an arms race and the conditions under which it is conducted can dramatically affect the success of any strategy designed to end it[58]. [38] Michael D. Intriligator & Dagobert L. Brito, Formal Models of Arms Races, Journal of Peace Science 2, 1(1976): 7788. PDF Mistrust, Misperception, and Misunderstanding: Imperfect Information The real peril of a hasty withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, though, can best be understood in political, not military, terms. To what extent does today's mainstream media provide us with an objective view of war? Moreover, the usefulness of this model requires accurately gauging or forecasting variables that are hard to work with. Human security is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. For example, one prisone r may seemingly betray the other , but without losing the other's trust. In a case with a random group of people, most would choose not to trust strangers with their success. What is the key claim of the 'Liberal Democratic Peace' thesis? > The Stag Hunt Theory and the Formation Social of Contracts : Networks In international relations terms, the states exist in anarchy. Discuss. Most prominently addressed in Nick Bostroms Superintelligence, the creation of an artificial superintelligence (ASI)[24] requires exceptional care and safety measures to avoid developing an ASI whose misaligned values and capacity can result in existential risks for mankind. Here, this is expressed as P_(h|A or B) (A)h_(A or B). (1) the responsibility of the state to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement; What is the difference between structural and operational conflict prevention? Nations are able to communicate with each other freely, something that is forbidden in the traditional PD game. If security increases cant be distinguished as purely defensive, this decreases instability. These strategies are not meant to be exhaustive by any means, but hopefully show how the outlined theory might provide practical use and motivate further research and analysis. A person's choice to bind himself to a social contract depends entirely on his beliefs whether or not the other person's or people's choice. 0000001656 00000 n The dynamics changes once the players learn with whom to interact with. [47] look at different policy responses to arms race de-escalation and find that the model or game that underlies an arms race can affect the success of policies or strategies to mitigate or end the race. Read about me, or email me. Additionally, both actors perceive the potential returns to developing AI to be greater than the potential harms. Scholars of civil war have argued, for example, that peacekeepers can preserve lasting cease-fires by enabling warring parties to cooperate with the knowledge that their security will be guaranteed by a third party. Table 4. Next, I outline my theory to better understand the dynamics of the AI Coordination Problem between two opposing international actors. Why do trade agreements even exist? [31] Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council: Committee on Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Executive Office of the President of the United States (October 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf; Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy Executive Office of the President of the United States (December 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-Intelligence-Automation-Economy.PDF. This iterated structure creates an incentive to cooperate; cheating in the first round significantly reduces the likelihood that the other player will trust one enough to attempt to cooperate in the future. Since the payoff of hunting the stags is higher, these interactions lead to an environment in which the Stag Hunters prosper. 15. {\displaystyle a>b\geq d>c} One significant limitation of this theory is that it assumes that the AI Coordination Problem will involve two key actors. The Stag Hunt game, derived from Rousseaus story, describes the following scenario: a group of two or more people can cooperate to hunt down the more rewarding stag or go their separate ways and hunt less rewarding hares. In the long term, environmental regulation in theory protects us all, but even if most of the countries sign the treaty and regulate, some like China and the US will not forsovereigntyreasons, or because they areexperiencinggreat economic gain. The prototypical example of a PGG is captured by the so-called NPD. [51] An analogous scenario in the context of the AI Coordination Problem could be if both international actors have developed, but not yet unleashed an ASI, where knowledge of whether the technology will be beneficial or harmful is still uncertain. Half a stag is better than a brace of rabbits, but the stag will only be brought down with a . [20] Will Knight, Could AI Solve the Worlds Biggest Problems? MIT Technology Review, January 12, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/545416/could-ai-solve-the-worlds-biggest-problems/. What are the two exceptions to the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter? War is anarchic, and intervening actors can sometimes help to mitigate the chaos. The reason is because the traditional PD game does not fully capture the strategic options and considerations available to each player. These remain real temptations for a political elite that has survived decades of war by making deals based on short time horizons and low expectations for peace. Nonetheless many would call this game a stag hunt. Prisoner's Dilemma - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 0 An example of norm enforcement provided by Axelrod (1986: 1100) is of a man hit in the face with a bottle for failing to support a lynching in the Jim Crow South. Table 1. [11] This Article conceptualizes a stag hunt in which the participants are countries that host extractive companies on their stock exchanges, including the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom, the Member States . This means that it remains in U.S. interests to stay in the hunt for now, because, if the game theorists are right, that may actually be the best path to bringing our troops home for good. Overall, the errors overstated the companys net income by 40%. Here, values are measured in utility. Specifically, it is especially important to understand where preferences of vital actors overlap and how game theory considerations might affect these preferences.